Original Article

At a basic level, the idea of a "Thing-In-Itself" or "Independent Reality" refers to a mode of existence that is distinct from and not dependent upon consciousness. This stands in contrast to a mode of being that is conscious, often referred to as "Being-For-Itself".

Jean-Paul Sartre, as discussed in the sources, makes this distinction central to his ontology, presenting two primary modes of being: being-for-itself (consciousness) and being-in-itself (nonconscious being). The being-in-itself is characterized as being independent of consciousness, having no consciousness itself, and being causally determined. It simply "is what it is". This mode of being encompasses the objects of consciousness, existing things in the world like a pebble or a chestnut tree. These things exist "solidly," like the root of a tree.

Sartre posits that this being-in-itself is the "transphenomenal being" of phenomena, underlying the things that appear to consciousness. It's the being of the world that is implied by consciousness. For a being to exist in-itself, it only needs itself and refers only to itself. It is not an abstraction.

The being-for-itself, on the other hand, is fundamentally different. It is a being that "is not what it is and which is what it is not". It escapes the rigid confines of identity that characterize the in-itself. Consciousness (the for-itself) can only exist in relation to something other than itself. The two regions of being, in-itself and for-itself, are described as "absolutely separated", posing a difficulty in establishing a bond between them. The for-itself is removed from the concept of a substance and from the nature of the in-itself. From this perspective, consciousness cannot simply "construct" the transcendent being-in-itself from subjective elements.

The relationship between the for-itself and the in-itself is complex, particularly when considering perception and knowledge. Consciousness is seen as an "appeal to being," inherently referring to a being-in-itself which is the object of that consciousness. Knowledge, in a traditional sense, involves positing an object in front of consciousness. The being of phenomena exists as an in-itself which is what it is. Sartre suggests that the for-itself, by denying that it is being, actually makes there be a world.

Realism, in one view, grants that being is present to consciousness in knowledge, and that the for-itself adds nothing to the in-itself except the very fact that "there is" in-itself, through what is termed "affirmative negation". From this perspective, everything is given and present to consciousness without distance and in its complete reality; nothing of what is seen originates solely from consciousness. Yet, despite this immediate presence, an "infinite distance" seems to slip in between consciousness and being. Knowing, in this framework, ideally involves "being-what-one-knows," but its original structure is "not-being-what-is-known".

The notion of "Independent Reality" echoes the characteristics of the in-itself. Objects of consciousness are seen as independent of consciousness, as independently real things-in-themselves. Some philosophical traditions suggest that things appearing outside the mind are simply ideas within the mind, similar to dreams or hallucinations, and that the existence of an external object cannot be proven to be different from the consciousness of it. This view, sometimes illustrated with the example of blue color and the consciousness of blue color being identical because they are always perceived together, proposes that the mind, as a stream of ideas, is the only reality, and external things are merely mental constructs.

However, other perspectives emphasize the crucial role of a "stubbornly independent reality" for the very formation of identity. Without recognizing facts and truths over which we have no direct control, it's argued, we wouldn't be able to distinguish ourselves from what is other than ourselves, and we couldn't articulate our specific identity.

Delving deeper, the sources reveal more intricate aspects of this relationship. The in-itself, as pure being, is revealed through what might seem like empty concepts such as worldliness, spatiality, quantity, instrumentality, and temporality. These are seen not as adding anything to being itself, but rather as "nihilated conditions" that enable the realization of "there is". Quality, for instance, can be understood as the being of a "this" when considered in isolation. The for-itself, by negating itself from various viewpoints when confronting a "this," reveals quality as a new "this" against the background of the thing.

The internal negation—the for-itself's process of determining itself not to be the in-itself—is described as the fundamental connection between the being of the for-itself and the being of the in-itself. The concrete, real in-itself is wholly present within consciousness as that which consciousness defines itself as not being. The in-itself is the starting point for this internal negation. The for-itself, in this context, is seen as nothing more than the "emptiness" where the in-itself stands out.

The emergence of the for-itself from the in-itself can be viewed hypothetically as the in-itself's "attempt" to found itself, to achieve the status of an "in-itself-for-itself" or a "self-cause". However, ontology, the study of being, cannot definitively state that this project originates within the in-itself; rather, the possibility of such a foundation comes into the world through the for-itself. This raises profound metaphysical questions about why the for-itself arises in relation to being and whether the totality of reality should be considered as a synthetic organization of the in-itself and the for-itself.

Connecting back to desire, the sources mention encountering concrete existents in the world (the objects of desire) which are perceived as types of in-itself. Desire is a relationship with these existents. This links to the idea that self-consciousness needs an external object to differentiate itself. Desire, in this sense, is a wish to possess the external object, transforming it into something that belongs to oneself and stripping away its foreignness. The desire to "have" concrete, contingent objects is related to the desire to "be" the ideal in-itself-for-itself. Possession of an object is seen as a continuous creation, yet the object remains distinct, existing by itself as in-itself.

Furthermore, from another philosophical standpoint, things and the world are primarily understood in terms of their use or "ready-to-hand" quality (equipment) rather than merely as "present-at-hand" or independent external objects. Viewing the world as purely "real" or present-at-hand is considered a secondary way of seeing it. Also, the distinction between things as they appear to us (objects of experience) and things as they are in themselves can be understood not as a difference between two separate sets of objects, but as different ways of conceptualizing the same objects.

Some perspectives suggest that the separation between the subject (thinker, knower) and the object (thought, known) is abstract. In the concrete experience of reality, there is just a process of experiencing, without a distinct object to be grasped or a separate subject doing the grasping. When the idea of the "self" is no longer rigidly identified with one's real nature, the subject-object relationship can shift to one of mutuality, where the subject and object co-create each other. From this viewpoint, the self is the totality of what it is aware of, and abstract concepts like the individual or the world are merely "abstract limits or terms of a concrete reality which is 'between' them". Even an individual experience itself can be seen as an object in its own right, a reality we are genuinely engaged with.

These different perspectives highlight the multifaceted nature of the "Thing-In-Itself" and "Independent Reality" across various philosophical traditions, exploring their definitions, their relationship to consciousness, and the complex ways they are conceived and experienced.

1. The Thing-in-Itself (Ding an sich): A Core Kantian Problem

• Origin & Context: This concept is primarily associated with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a pivotal figure in modern philosophy. It arises within the framework of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Kant was attempting to reconcile rationalism (emphasizing reason as the primary source of knowledge) and empiricism (emphasizing experience).
• What it is: The "Thing-in-Itself" refers to a reality that exists independently of our perception, understanding, and conceptual frameworks. It's what things are like “behind the scenes,” before they are filtered through our minds. Crucially, Kant argues we can posit (assume) its existence as necessary for explaining experience, but we cannot directly know it.
• Why is it problematic? Kant believed that all of our experiences are structured by innate categories of understanding – things like space, time, causality, and substance. These aren't properties of the world itself, but rather ways our minds organize sensory data to make sense of it. Therefore, when we perceive something (like a tree), what we experience is not the "tree-in-itself," but a representation of the tree that has been shaped by our cognitive apparatus. We can only know phenomena – appearances – not noumena – things as they are in themselves.
• Key Characteristics:
  • Unknowable (for us): This is the most important aspect. Because our minds actively shape experience, we cannot access the Thing-in-Itself directly. Any attempt to describe it would inevitably be a description of how we perceive it, which defeats the purpose.
  • Causal Source: Kant argues that the Thing-in-Iteslf is the cause of our sensations. We are affected by these unknowable things, and those affections give rise to our experiences. This is why he posits their existence – to explain why we have sensory data in the first place.
  • Transcendental: The Thing-in-Itself exists "transcendentally," meaning it lies beyond the realm of possible experience but is necessary for understanding how experience is even possible.

2. Independent Reality: A Broader Concept with Overlapping Meanings

• General Definition: "Independent reality" simply means a reality that exists regardless of whether anyone perceives it, thinks about it, or acknowledges its existence. It's the most basic sense in which we understand "reality." The Earth existed long before humans evolved to observe it; that’s an example of independent reality.
• Relationship to Kant: Kant's Thing-in-Itself is a form of independent reality – it exists independently of our minds. However, the concept of independent reality is broader than just the Kantian Thing-in-Itself. It can be used in contexts where the specific epistemological (theory of knowledge) concerns of Kant are not at play.
• Beyond Kant: The idea of an independent reality is fundamental to many philosophical positions:
  • Realism: Realist philosophies generally assert that there is a mind-independent reality, and our beliefs can accurately represent it (to varying degrees).
  • Materialism/Physicalism: These views hold that everything that exists is ultimately physical or material, existing independently of consciousness.
  • Platonism: Plato believed in a realm of Forms – perfect, eternal, and unchanging realities that exist independently of the physical world.

3. How They Relate: The Interplay & Distinction

Here's how these concepts connect and diverge:

• Thing-in-Itself as a Specific Type of Independent Reality: The Thing-in-Itself is a very specific, technically defined version of independent reality within Kant’s system. It represents the ultimate unknowable source of our experience.
• Independent Reality is Broader: The concept of "independent reality" can be used in discussions about metaphysics and ontology (the study of being) without necessarily invoking Kant's epistemology or his distinction between phenomena and noumena. You could talk about the independent reality of a distant galaxy without needing to bring up the Thing-in-Itself.
• The Crucial Limitation: The key difference lies in knowability. While both concepts posit something existing independently, only the Thing-in-Itself is explicitly declared unknowable by its originator. Independent reality, in more general usage, implies at least the possibility of knowing it, even if that knowledge is incomplete or imperfect.
• Kant's Motivation: Kant introduced the Thing-in-Itself precisely to acknowledge a limit to human knowledge. It was his way of saying, "We can only know appearances; there’s something more out there, but we can’t grasp it directly."

Illustrative Analogy:

Imagine a radio signal. The independent reality is the electromagnetic wave itself – it exists whether or not anyone is listening. The Thing-in-Itself is like the source of that wave—the transmitter—which you cannot see or fully understand, but which you know must be there to produce the signal you receive. You only experience the translated version (the music) through your radio receiver (your mind).

Suggestions for Further Exploration:

• Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: This is the primary source! Be prepared for dense and challenging reading, but it’s essential for understanding the concept in its original context.
• Phenomenology vs. Noumenon: Research these terms to understand Kant’s distinction between what we can know (phenomena) and what we cannot (noumena).
• Idealism vs. Realism: Explore different philosophical positions regarding the nature of reality. George Berkeley's Idealism, which argues that "to be is to be perceived," offers a direct contrast to Kant’s view.
• Transcendental Idealism: This is the name Kant gives to his own philosophy – it combines elements of idealism (the mind plays an active role in shaping experience) and realism (there is something out there that we are experiencing).
• Contemporary Interpretations of the Thing-in-Itself: Some contemporary philosophers have attempted to reinterpret or rehabilitate the concept, arguing that Kant’s unknowability thesis is too strong.